The Frasnes Letter

In 1876, in his history of the Waterloo Campaign, a German historian by the name of Ollech published a copy of a letter written at 10.30 a.m. on 16 June 1815 by the Duke of Wellington, commander of the Anglo-Dutch-German Army in the Netherlands to Field Marshal Prince Blücher, the commander of the Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine. The content of this letter was so controversial and so damning Ollech went to the trouble of printing it in facsimile so there could be no question as to the fact that it was in Wellington’s hand. This letter was written on the heights behind a village by the name of Frasnes, just south of the important road junction of Quatre Bras where the Duke would fight a battle that day. It was written after the Duke had issued movement orders to his army that morning, and after he had inspected the French positions to his front. Wellington thus knew where his own army was at the time he wrote the letter, where it was likely to move to that day, and what opposition he considered likely from the French. Ironically, as the Duke did not speak German, and Blücher did not understand English, this letter was written in French, the language of their common enemy. It read:

‘On the heights behind Frasne[s],
16th June 1815, at 10.30 [a.m.]

‘My dear Prince!

‘My army is situated as follows. The Army Corps of the Prince of Orange has one division here and Quatre Bras, the remainder at Nivelles. The Reserve is on the march from Waterloo on Genappe where it will arrive at midday. The English cavalry will be at Nivelles at the same time. Lord Hill’s Corps is at Braine le Comte.

‘I do not see much of the enemy before you, and I await news from Your Highness and the arrival of troops to decide my operations for the day.

‘Nothing has appeared near Binche, nor on your right.

‘Your very obedient servant.

‘Wellington’.¹

The publication of this letter set off a debate between British and German historians which was only interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War. German historians such as Lehmann,²Delbrück,³ Pflugk-Harttung⁴ and Lettow-Vorbeck⁵ produced further archive material in support of the case that Wellington had deliberately misled his Prussian allies into fighting a battle at Ligny that day, accusations that had originally been made nearer the time by Blücher,⁶ Gneisenau⁷ and other senior Prussian officers. British historians such as Robinson⁸ and Horsburgh⁹ attempted to find an explanation for this letter, referring to a ‘Disposition’ apparently written by Colonel Sir William Howe de Lancey, Wellington’s Deputy Quartermaster-General (i.e. chief-of-staff) for Wellington’s information, which, they claimed, was erroneous, and misled the Duke to such an extent that he, by accident, had provided his allies with false information.

The De Lancey Disposition

At 7 a.m. on 16 June 1815, De Lancey apparently wrote the following ‘Disposition’ for Wellington’s information:

‘Disposition of the British Army at 7 o’clock A.M., 16th June.

‘The above disposition written out for the information of the Commander of the Forces by Colonel Sir W. De Lancey. The centre column of names indicates the places at which the troops had arrived or were moving on. The column on the right of the paper indicates the places the troops were ordered to proceed to at 7 o’clock A.M., 16th June, previous to any attack on the British.
                                                ‘(Signed)                 DE LACY EVANS.’¹⁰

The validity of this document is accepted by certain historians without question. According to this interpretation, De Lancey drafted this document in Brussels and handed it to Wellington at some time before 10.30 a.m.; and that, using the information provided by it, the Duke then wrote a letter to Blücher from Frasnes at 10.30 a.m.

Wellington and Blücher

Wellington had a good personal relationship with Blücher, the Prince trusting the Duke implicitly. When Major Count Nostitz, Blücher’s ADC, questioned Wellington’s intention to come to the aid of the Prussians, Blücher dismissed the accusation. Nostitz’s account read, ‘… I received the answer that against a man like the Duke, who had such a glorious record, any doubt in his word whatsoever was a crime’.¹¹

Nostitz outlined the promises made by Wellington to Blücher as follows:

‘… the Duke [of Wellington] can certainly be accused in all conferences, in which either the Prince himself [Blücher] or officers representing him, discussed the common measures to be taken at the opening of hostilities, of having expressed every time the certainty that he was fully prepared in the event of the Prussians being the first to be attacked by the main French force, of being in a position to give rapid and substantial support, while we can be accused of having unquestionably believed these assurances’.¹²

On the morning of 16 June, Wellington rode to the Prussian headquarters for a personal meeting with Blücher, where the Duke was again to repeat his promises of support. As the Prince had such a high regard for Wellington, there can be little doubt that Blücher would believe whatever he was told.

Wellington’s Promises of Aid

On 3 May 1815, Wellington and Blücher held a strategy conference in the town of Tirlemont. Here they agreed that, in the event of a French attack on the Prussian army via Charleroi, the Prussians would withdraw as slowly as possible, staging a major holding action in the Sombreffe position. That would allow the Duke to concentrate his forces and bring them into play in support of the Prussians. The French would thus be outnumbered, outflanked and defeated.

After 12 June, when it seemed likely that Napoleon was about to launch his offensive and that its immediate victim was to be the Prussian positions in and around Charleroi, Wellington made a series of promises of support to the Prussians. These included:

1. A letter from Generallieutenant von Zieten, commander of the Prussian I Army Corps, with its headquarters in Charleroi, to Blücher’s headquarters in Namur, reporting that Wellington, in response to reports of French movements, had, on 14 June, promised to move his army on Nivelles.¹³
2. A report from Generalmajor von Müffling, Prussian liaison officer in Wellington’s headquarters, sent from there on the morning of 15 June in which Müffling passed on the following from the Duke, ‘The Anglo-Batavian army is, according to the enclosed order-of-battle, deployed in such a way that Lord Hill and the Prince of Orange, in positions from Enghien via Braine le Comte to Nivelle[s], can be concentrated in a short time.’¹⁴
3. A letter written at 7 p.m. on 15 June by Müffling from Wellington’s headquarters and containing the words, ‘As soon as the moon comes out, the Reserve will march off, and if the enemy does not attack at Nivelles immediately, then the Duke will be at Nivelles with his entire forces tomorrow to support Your Highness, or, in the event of the enemy having already attacked, after consultations with you, will move on either his flank or rear’.¹⁵
4. Sometime during the evening of 15 June, Wellington sent Generallieutenant Graf von Gneisenau, the Prussian chief-of-staff, a message indicating that his army would be concentrated within twelve hours.¹⁶
5. Towards midnight of that day, Müffling sent a report to Blücher indicating that Wellington’s army would be concentrated within twelve hours, and that he would have 20,000 men at Quatre Bras by 10 a.m. on 16 June.¹⁷ This was possibly the same message as above.
6. A report from Major von Brünneck, an officer sent by Blücher to Quatre Bras early on 16 June to establish the situation there, timed at that, ‘The Prince of Orange believes that within the next three hours, the entire Belgian army and the bulk of the English army can be concentrated at Nivelles’.¹⁸  The Netherlands chief-of-staff, Major-General de Major-General de Rebecque noted in his Journal that when the Prince returned from Brussels at 3 a.m., he reported that Wellington had decided to ‘send all his forces to Quatre Bras’, so the Prince was passing on information originating from the Duke.