The Meeting at Brye

The Frasnes letter having been dispatched, Müffling’s account of the next event related, ‘as the enemy was being quiet [at Frasnes], and as meanwhile a report had come to me that the Prussian army was assembling at Ligny, the Duke was of the opinion that it would be best to ride to the Field Marshal [Blücher] and to agree with him orally what measures were to be taken for a decisive battle with united forces.’ ⁵¹

Dörnberg’s account confirmed this, adding, ‘a patrol of Prussian hussars arrived, informing the Duke that Marshal Blücher was at Sombreffe. He said to me he wanted to ride there and I should accompany him. Along with several of his adjutants, General von Müffling rode with us.’⁵²

It is interesting to note that neither Dörnberg nor Müffling was apparently aware that Wellington had recently written Blücher a letter.

So at about midday, Wellington rode to meet Blücher at his headquarters at the Windmill of Bussy at Brye. He was accompanied by Müffling, Dörnberg, FitzRoy Somerset, Sir Alexander Gordon and others, and escorted by a detachment of hussars. Müffling related,

‘…while on our way, the Duke said to me:

“If, as it seems, what the enemy has standing at Frasnes opposite Quatre Bras, is so insignificant, and should only mask the English army, then I can use my entire strength to support the Field Marshal, and everything he wishes as a joint operation, I will gladly carry out.”’⁵³

Between noon and 1 p.m. on 16 June, Wellington arrived at Blücher’s headquarters. Here, he met not only Blücher, but also other Prussian officers including Gneisenau, Blücher’s chief-of-staff; Oberstlieutenant von Reiche, chief-of-staff of the I Army Corps; Oberst von Clausewitz, chief-of-staff of the III Army Corps; Nostitz, Blücher’s ADC; and Generalmajor von Grolman, a senior officer attached to Blücher’s staff. One neutral participant was the Prince August of Thurn und Taxis, a Bavarian who was attached as an observer to Blücher’s headquarters. Sir Henry Hardinge, a captain of the Foot Guards and the Duke of Wellington’s representative in the Prussian headquarters, was also present. A number of these eye-witnesses have left accounts of this meeting, conducted, ironically, in French, as neither Wellington nor Hardinge could speak German, and only Dörnberg could speak English.

Although there are differences, principally in matters of detail, there is a general consensus in the essential point of this meeting, namely when and how Wellington was going to move to support the Prussians. The testimony of various participants in this meeting was briefly as follows:

Müffling:

The Duke of Wellington said, ‘What do you want me to do?’. Gneisenau and the Duke then discussed how Wellington’s forces were to become involved in the Battle of Ligny, which was to be by means of a flanking attack. The Duke agreed to march from Quatre Bras to Brye.⁵⁴

This account is consistent with the written promises made by on behalf of the Duke in recent hours. As such, it is credible.

Dörnberg:

The Duke of Wellington said, ‘Do tell me of your opinion as to what you wish me to do.’⁵⁵ (This is merely a different translation of what Müffling recorded). Wellington agreed to attack the French flank, but gave no firm decision.

One would expect Dörnberg’s sympathies to lie with the British, the protectors of his homeland, and his paymasters. His account too makes it clear that the subject of Wellington’s intervention in the forthcoming battle was the main issue discussed at this meeting.

Reiche:

The Duke of Wellington promised ‘substantial support and assistance’⁵⁶

Clausewitz:

Wellington’s army was gathering at Quatre Bras and would be coming to the assistance of the Prussians. The Duke promised: ‘At four o’clock, I will be here’.⁵⁷

Nostitz:

His account also makes mention of the Duke’s ‘promise of substantial support’. Nostitz also remarked that ‘the Duke repeated his promise’.⁵⁸

As Blücher’s ADC, it was likely he had seen the incoming correspondence from Wellington. Nostitz’s comment, coming from an account based on a diary kept at the time, underlines that the promises made by the Duke at the meeting were actually a repetition of promises made earlier.

Grolman:

He recorded Wellington as having stated that, ‘I am convinced that by 2 p.m. I will have so many troops assembled that I can go over to the offensive immediately thereafter’. After this commitment, the Prussians made the decision to accept battle.⁵⁹

Thurn und Taxis:

He recorded that Wellington promised to send 20,000 men to support the Prussians by 3 p.m.⁶⁰ His account was based on a diary kept at the time and is likely to be reliable. As a Bavarian officer, the Prince’s interests lay more with the British than with the Prussians. One would not expect him to take the Prussian side in any dispute, which is another reason for considering this account to be reliable.

Not only are there more mentions of the Duke’s promise, but also an indication that the Prussians had not yet fully committed themselves to battle. Indeed, even at that stage, I Army Corps could have mounted a rearguard action, with II and III Army Corps falling back towards the Gembloux position where IV Army Corps would arrive the next day. Here, the entire Prussian army could have been concentrated for 17 June. However, this would have left Wellington open to an attack by a substantial part of the French army.

One further account to consider is that of a Prussian artillery officer, Kapitain Reuter, who commanded the 12 Pounder Battery No 6 that day at the Battle of Ligny. While the meeting between Wellington and Blücher was in progress, his commanding officer, General von Holtzendorf, came up and ordered him to have his number one gun fire a round. ‘We were told,’ he said, ‘at the time that this was a signal to our army corps that the Prince had made up his mind to accept battle’,⁶¹ a statement that makes it quite clear that, in the presence of Wellington and as a result of his meeting with Blücher, the Battle of Ligny was started.

Gordon, who met his death at Waterloo, did not leave a record of the meeting.⁶² FitzRoy Somerset’s account noted,

‘When the Duke arrived at Quatre Bras he found the Prince of Orange there - he observed only a few of the Enemy in front, who occasionally fired a shot & a little popping Musketry, but nothing more serious was at that time threatened in that Quarter. The Duke accompanied by his Staff & a small escort of Cavalry rode from Quatre Bras between 11 & 12 o’clock to Blücher’s positions. The Marshal was at Butte St. Croix. The Prussian Troops were found in close Columns on the Heights in rear of St. Amand & Ligny which were occupied & the left of the Prussian Army extended beyond Sombreff[e].
     ‘The Duke & Blücher saw the French in great force advancing towards the Prussians & the Duke observed to Blücher that he would soon be attacked.
     ‘The Duke expecting that our Cavalry, the remainder of the Prince of Orange’s Corps, the Guards & Alten’s Division would arrive at Quatre Bras about 2 o’clock, told Blücher that he would give him all the support in his power & the Duke gallopped [sic] back to Quatre Bras…’ ⁶³

The next eye-witness accounts that should be considered are those of Wellington and Hardinge. Firstly, to Wellington’s own account, as noted by De Ros in one of his conversations with the Duke between 1836 and 1840,

‘I told the Prussian officers, in the presence of Hardinge, that according to my judgement, the exposure of the advanced columns, and, indeed, of the whole army to cannonade, standing as they did so displayed to the aim of the enemy’s fire, was not so prudent. The marshy banks of the stream made it out of their power to cross and attack the French, while the latter on the other hand, though they could not attack them, had it in their power to cannonade them and shatter them to pieces, after which they might fall upon them by the bridges at the villages. I said that if I were in Blücher’s place with English troops, I should withdraw all the columns I saw scattered about in front, and get more of the troops under shelter of the rising ground. However, they seemed to think they knew best, so I came away very shortly.’ ⁶⁴

Wellington’s account here would seem to indicate that the Prussians had, apparently on their own initiative, decided to fight a battle in a poorly selected position, and did so against the advice of the Duke of Wellington.

Secondly to Hardinge, who also made similar comments in a conversation involving the Duke and the Earl Stanhope, on 26 October 1837, and whose record of the discussion mentioned,

‘When you [Wellington] had examined the Prussian position, I remember you much disapproved of it, and said to me, if they fight here, they will be damnably mauled.

‘I told them so myself, but of course in different terms. I said to them, everybody knows their own army best; but if I were to fight with mine here, I should expect to be beat.

‘Turning to me, and marking the back of one hand with the fingers of the other, he [the Duke] added: “They were dotted in this way - all their bodies along the slope of a hill, so that no cannon-ball missed its effect upon them …”.’ ⁶⁵

Dörnberg, who accompanied the Duke back to Quatre Bras, described the scene. ‘As we rode away, the brave Blücher accompanied us for a small distance. When he turned back, the Duke said to me: “What a fine fellow he is!”’ ⁶⁶

Evidently, at no time in this meeting were Wellington and Hardinge out of earshot of other participants. Their comments must have been made in the presence of witnesses, yet nobody else records having heard any such criticism of the Prussian positions. Indeed, according to the version told to De Ros, the Duke claimed to have complained to the Prussian officers there, yet none of them recorded such comments; neither did the Hanoverian, nor the Bavarian officer present. Even FitzRoy Somerset’s version differs substantially from that of Wellington, confirming his promise of support and containing no mention of the Duke’s alleged criticism of the Prussians positions that FitzRoy Somerset described in some detail.

Thus of all the witnesses present at this meeting, only two, namely Wellington and Hardinge, mentioned any discussion on the wisdom of the Prussian decision to fight at Ligny and the positions they had selected, their comments apparently first being recorded some years after the event. These criticisms of the Prussian positions are strange as both Wellington and Blücher had agreed at their meeting at Tirlemont on 3 May 1815 that, in the event of a French offensive in this direction, the Prussians would stage a rearguard action on the Sombreffe position, of which the village of Ligny was a part, a position that had already been examined and that was considered well suited for the purpose.⁶⁷ What could explain such a disparity in the record?