Conclusions

It is on record that the Duke made several promises to be in a position to provide effective support for the Prussians on 16 June. These include his communication to Zieten of 14 June promising to move his army on Nivelles; his message to Blücher of 7 p.m. on 15 June, sent via Müffling, promising to be at Nivelles with his entire army the next day; his messages sent late on 15 June to Gneisenau and Blücher promising to have his army concentrated by the middle of the next day; this being confirmed by the Prince of Orange on the morning of 16 June, based on information given to him by the Duke. Not to be forgotten is the Frasnes letter, which arrived in the Prussian headquarters by noon on 16 June. The accusations made by Blücher and Gneisenau were first made as close to the event as possible, were consistent, and are supported by documentary evidence of which Wellington failed to keep copies in his records, or did not mention having sent in his accounts made in later years.

It is also on record that at 6 to 7 p.m. on 15 June, Wellington had De Lancey order Hill’s Corps to assemble in its positions in western Belgium, orders received late that night; that at 10 p.m., he first issued movement orders to this corps which could, at the earliest, be implemented the next morning, and was thus quite aware where Hill’s divisions were, and where they had been ordered to reach that day, yet at 10.30 a.m., apparently on the basis of a ‘Disposition’ supposedly produced for him by De Lancey, Wellington told Blücher that Hill’s Corps was at Braine-le-Comte when both of them knew it would not be there until the end of that day.

It would seem that the standard historical account presented in certain Anglophone campaign histories with regard to the meeting at Brye is based on little more than yarns told by Wellington to his friends in private conversations. The Duke had good reason to use whatever ammunition he could in his several public disputes with the Prussian General Staff in the decades following Waterloo, including any criticism of the Prussian positions at Ligny; but the fact that he did not do so publicly suggests that it is unwise to give much credence to the Duke’s purported criticism of the Prussian positions.

It is clear from the above that the central point of the meeting at Brye was Wellington’s promise to come to the aid of the Prussians with substantial forces in the afternoon of 16 June and that the Prussians accepted battle at Ligny on that basis, and on the basis of a series of promises that the Duke had made over the preceding hours. It is also clear from the above analysis of the actual positions of the Anglo-Dutch-German forces and Wellington’s knowledge of this, that he was aware that he was misleading Blücher and knew he would not be able to keep his promises. It would seem that the Duke duped Blücher into making a stand at Ligny on 16 June so that the Prussians could buy him the time he needed to concentrate his forces, time that Wellington had lost through his errors of judgement the previous day, and in the knowledge that if Blücher had known the reality of the situation, then he might well have fallen back, leaving Wellington’s scattered forces to bear the brunt of the French offensive and the subsequent consequences.