What is also a mystery is when and why Evans might have made a copy of this document. The note on it attributed to him contains the sentence: ‘The column on the right of the paper indicates the places the troops were ordered to proceed to at 7 o’clock A.M., 16th June, previous to any attack on the British’.⁸³ This clearly indicates that Evans’ supposed involvement in the provenance of this document was at some time after the events of 16 June, as, how else could he have known that the British were going to be attacked? Evans was an ‘extra aide-de-camp’ to Ponsonby.⁸⁴ The headquarters of Ponsonby’s Brigade was in Ghent, about 50 km from Brussels.⁸⁵ Evans does not appear to have been at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball on 15 June, at least he was not on the guest list.⁸⁶ Thus, it seems unlikely that if he had arrived in Brussels after the ball, that is after 3 a.m. on 16 June, he, as an officer not attached to the Brussels headquarters and with insufficient knowledge of the entire army’s dispositions, would have been given the task of writing out this document for De Lancey which was apparently finished some time after 7 a.m. Ponsonby, who was at the ball, had left Brussels to return to his headquarters earlier that morning, so if Evans, his ADC, had been with him, then it is likely that he would have departed with his commander.

All the more strange is that the contents of the ‘Disposition’ as apparently copied by Evans conflict with Evans’ own report on the Battle of Waterloo as given to Major-General Sir George Murray, a report that is likely to have been written shortly after these events. The pertinent section of this report mentioned that, ‘On the 16th [June] were fought the Sanguinary Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. In both cases, the Enemy possessed a vast numerical superiority. The 4th Prussian Corps being yet absent, as was the whole of the British Cavalry, besides a large Portion of Artillery and Infantry.’⁸⁷ Why would this officer have copied and signed a document that conflicted with the facts as he knew them?

Now to the issue of the Frasnes letter: Wellington’s papers, neither printed nor manuscript, contain a copy of it. Neither Dörnberg, nor Müffling, who had accompanied Wellington to the front that day, indicated they were aware it had been written. Throughout the rest of his life, the Duke never made a reference to having written it. It was first located by Ollech who then reproduced it in his history of the campaign published in 1876. It gave Blücher information that Wellington clearly knew was false and repeated promises the Duke had made earlier, promises he knew he could not keep.

The Duke’s Accounts of the Meeting at Brye

There seems to be a certain inconsistency here. There is no account, either from Wellington, or from Hardinge, of the substance of the meeting at Brye, namely, in what manner the Duke was going to support the Prussians that day. Both mention their apparent criticisms of the Prussian positions, while most witnesses speak only of Wellington’s promised support, the Duke and his representative just recorded implications that Blücher was unwise in accepting battle at Ligny. However, the evidence suggests that battle was only accepted on the basis of Wellington’s promises; promises the Duke knew he could not keep. Besides, on 3 May 1815, both Wellington and Blücher had agreed that, in the event of a French offensive in this direction, the Prussians would fight a rearguard action with part of their army in this position. Why then was it that years later, the Duke started complaining that the position he agreed the Prussians would take up was so poorly chosen?

Hardinge was attached to Blücher’s headquarters. What he and Wellington said to each other was in the presence of not only the senior Prussian officers, but also a Hanoverian and a Bavarian officer whose testimony has been quoted above. None of them mentioned a conversation even vaguely similar to that Hardinge and Wellington described. So where and when did the conversation, in which the Prussian positions were apparently criticised, take place?

Thus the historian examining Wellington’s activities on 16 June is inevitably confronted by a number of questionable documents and statements, a ‘Disposition’ that cannot be genuine, a letter in which Wellington knowingly deceived Blücher, a ‘Memorandum’ which contains false statements, a compromising document which is missing from the record and inconsistent accounts from Wellington, as well as two accounts of a meeting that vary so significantly from those of the majority of participants that one has to wonder if it is really the same meeting that is being discussed.

In 1837, the Earl Stanhope apparently recorded a conversation with the Duke of Wellington and Hardinge, which is given above. This is evidently the first mention on record of the Duke making any criticism of the Prussian positions at Ligny.

The next mention can be found in Maxwell’s Life of Wellington, published in 1900, where Maxwell quotes from the ‘Manuscript notes by William, 20th Baron de Ros, on conversations with the Duke of Wellington 1836-40’ in which the Duke made critical comments on the Prussian positions at Ligny. This quotation ends with the claim that Wellington could from Quatre Bras observe the Battle of Ligny through his glass, which is quite impossible as the distance was several miles and hills intervened. As the Duke was clearly telling tall stories here, how reliable are his comments on the Prussian positions?

The final mention is dated 25 September 1851, shortly before the old Duke died. These comments were apparently made during a conversation with the Earl of Ellesmere. He commented, ‘It is true that I went to the Moulin de Bry and saw the Prussian army formed to receive battle. My observation was, “We each of us know our own army best! I should not have formed mine in this defensive position as yours is. I should have held them further back, and would have thus protected them from the effect of the French artillery.” Gneisenau made me an angry answer - I believe, that the Prussians liked to see the enemy!’⁸⁸

Again, this is hearsay evidence apparently originating from an unreliable witness, and it would be wrong to place any credibility on the content of a fireside chat between old friends. Indeed, in the same work, there is a copy of notes made by Wellington on Waterloo in the article submitted by Ellesmere to the Quarterly Review in 1845.⁸⁹ Here, the Duke made no criticisms of the Prussian positions at Ligny, even though he made mention of the meeting at Brye. Furthermore, there are certain inconsistencies between each version of the same events.

Not to be forgotten is Müffling’s record on this point. He stated that, ‘The Duke examined the measures taken and appeared to be satisfied with them.’⁹⁰

While the meeting at Brye was taking place, Napoleon had been reconnoitring the Prussian positions. Shortly after, at 2 p.m., he had the following message sent to Ney, ‘The Emperor has charged me to inform you that the enemy has assembled one corps of troops between Sombreffe and Brye, and that at 2.30 p.m., Marshal Grouchy will attack them with the 3rd and 4th corps.’⁹¹

In later accounts, Napoleon tried to deny his error.⁹² The Prussian position at Ligny was so well chosen, and their troops so well deployed in the dead ground, in tall crops and in villages, that Napoleon, having reviewed their positions, even from the vantage point of the Tombe de Ligny, failed to observe two of the three corps there. This is a clear indication of exactly how well chosen the Prussian positions were, how little exposed their troops really were, and how much value should be placed on Wellington’s alleged comments.